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Problems with Automation
• Brittle
– Automation often operates well for a range of situations but requires human 
intervention to handle boundary conditions (Woods & Cook, 2006)
• Opaque
– Automation interfaces often do not facilitate understanding or tracking of the system 
(Lyons, 2013)
• Miscalibrated Trust
– Disuse and misuse of automation have lead to real-world mishaps and tragedies (Lee 
& See, 2004; Lyons & Stokes, 2012)
• Out–of-the-Loop Loss of Situation Awareness
– Trade-off: automation helps manual performance and workload but recovering from 
automation failure is often worse (Endsley, 2016; Onnasch, Wickens, Li, Manzey, 
2014)
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HAT Solutions to Problems with Automation
• Brittle
– Negotiated decisions puts a layer of human flexibility into system behavior
• Opaque
– Requires that systems be designed to be transparent, present rationale and 
confidence
– Communication should be in terms the operator can easily understand (shared 
language)
• Miscalibrated Trust
– Automation display of rationale helps human operator know when to trust it
• Out–of-the-Loop Loss of Situation Awareness
– Keep operator in control; adaptable, not adaptive automation
– Greater interaction (e.g., negotiation) with automation reduces likelihood of being out 
of the loop
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Simulated Ground Station
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Autonomous Constrained Flight Planner (ACFP)
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Recommended airports  
- rank ordered.
Original
Adding HAT Principles to the Ground Station
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With Added 
Transparency
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Adding HAT Principles to the Ground Station
• Transparency: Divert reasoning and 
factor weights are displayed.
• Negotiation/Dialog: Operators can 
change factor weights to match their 
priorities.
• Shared Language/Communication: 
Numeric output from ACFP was found 
to be misleading by pilots. Display now 
uses English categorical descriptions.
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Adding HAT Principles to the Ground Station
• Human-Directed: Operator calls “Plays” to determine who does what
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HAT Simulation: Tasks
• Participants, with the help of automation, monitored 30 aircraft 
– Alerted pilots when
• Aircraft was off path or pilot failed to comply with clearances
• Significant weather events affect aircraft trajectory
• Pilot failed to act on EICAS alerts
– Rerouted aircraft when
• Weather impacted the route
• System failures or medical events force diversions
• Ran with HAT tools and without HAT tools
14
HAT Simulation: Results
• Participants preferred the HAT condition overall (rated 8.5 out of 9).
• HAT displays and automation preferred for keeping up with operationally 
important issues (rated 8.67 out of 9)
• HAT displays and automation provided enough situational awareness to 
complete the task (rated 8.67 out of 9)
• HAT displays and automation reduced the workload relative to no HAT (rated 
8.33 out of 9) 
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HAT Simulation: Results
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• HAT workload reduction was marginally significant (HAT mean 1.7; No HAT 
mean 2.3, p = .07)
ATWIT Probe Number
HAT Simulation: Debrief
• Transparency/Shared Language
– “This [the recommendations table] is wonderful…. You would not find a dispatcher 
who would just be comfortable with making a decision without knowing why.”
• Negotiation
– “The sliders was [sic] awesome, especially because you can customize the route…. I 
am able to see what the difference was between my decision and [the computer’s 
decision].”
• Human-Directed Plays
– “This one was definitely awesome. Sometimes [without HAT] I even took my own 
decisions and forgot to look at the QRH because I was very busy, but that didn’t 
happen when I had the HAT.”
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Where we are and planned FY17 work
• Trust repair with automated system part-task 
• Implementing HAT features on the flight deck 
• Developing a software framework for creating HAT Agents
• Updating ground station re-routing tool
• UX testing
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Summer ’17 (Ground Station Agent)
Spring ’17 (Flight Deck)
Now (Transparency Part Task)
CHAP-E
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Hierarchical Activity Planning
• Abstract idea of what will happen next
– Abstract plans, not fully defined (instantiated) at start
• Partially ordered, conditions on tasks
– Some tasks can be completed in any order
– Timing is dependent on circumstances
• Precise tasks become more clear as time goes on
– Interleaved execution and expansion
– Clearance changes, weather, equipment failures, errors cause plan revision
– Monitoring/projection detects failures, triggers revision
20
Flight (from, to)
FileFPlan(from,to,alt) ObtainClearance Taxi(rnwy) Fly(from,to) Taxi(gate) Shutdown
Takeoff(rwy) Climb Cruise Descend Approach Land(rwy) GoAround
Task Abstractions
Activity Plan Components
• Tasks
– Primitive
– Non-primitive
• Methods
– Method T:
Parameters: x,y
Subtasks: T1, T2, T3, T4
Constraints/Limitations: T1 -> T3, C -> T3
• Planner
– Expansion of tasks using methods
– Satisfaction of constraints
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Flight Processes Periodic Monitoring / Triggers
ATC Clearance
Clearance Monitoring
Airspeed Monitoring
Inform PF: 
“Check speed”
Airspeed Setting Process
Is airspeed  
within 
constraints?
No
Set 
airspeed to 
<airspeed>
Is airspeed 
reasonable 
and within 
constraints?
No
Periodic 
airspeed 
check
Periodic 
airspeed 
check
Call out 
<airspeed>
Verify speed 
setting
Initial 
Approach
Airspeed
ATC 
Approach 
ClearanceYes
Periodic 
monitoring
Clearance Process
Confirm
ATC 
Clearance
Activity Plan Construction
Flight Processes Periodic Monitoring / Triggers
Clearance Process
ATC: "NASA123 clear for 
ILS approach to RWY 28R 
speed <airspeed> to 
descend via MODESTO 5”
Clearance Monitoring
Airspeed Monitoring
Inform PF: “Check speed”
Airspeed Setting Process
Is airspeed  
within limits?
No
Set airspeed to 
<airspeed>
Is airspeed 
‘reasonable’?
No
Periodic 
airspeed check
Periodic 
airspeed check
Call out <airspeed>
Altitude Setting Process
Verify speed setting
Communicate with 
ATC: "NASA123, 
cleared ILS to 
28R, slowing to 
<airspeed>"
Request “set 
altitude to 
<altitude>”
Set MCP altitude to 
<altitude>
Verify altitude Verify altitude
Altitude Monitoring
Inform PF: “Check airspeed”
Is altitude 
within limits?
No
Is altitude 
‘reasonable’?
No
Periodic altitude 
check
Periodic altitude 
check
Localizer Capture Process
Call out 
“localizer 
captured”
Confirm localizer captured
Initial Approach
Localizer Monitoring
Is localizer 
captured?
Yes
Periodic localizer 
check
Glideslope Monitoring
Glideslope Capture Process
Call out 
“glideslope 
captured”
Confirm glideslope captured
Flap Setting Process
Request Flaps to 
<flaps setting>
Confirm flap setting at 
<flaps setting>
Flap Change Monitoring
Speed 
appropriate 
for flaps 
<flaps 
setting>?
No
Inform PF: “Check altitude”
Yes
Move flaps to <flaps setting>
Call out “Flaps 
<flaps setting>”
Periodic 
monitoring
Altitude 
within 
limits?x
Airspeed 
within limits? FMAs ..?
Inform PF: “check altitude” Inform PF: “check airspeed” Call out “???”
No
Airspeed
Altitude
Altitude Airspeed
FMAs
Localizer
ATC 
Approach 
ClearanceYes
Periodic 
monitoring
Cancel Approach Process
Call out 
“glideslope 
captured”
Confirm glideslope captured
23
(PM) CheckSpeed
(PF) RequestFlaps
(PM) MoveFlaps
(PF) ConfirmFlaps
(PM) CallOutFlaps
SetFlaps(LandingFlaps)SetSpeed(VREF+5)
SetMissedApprAltCaptureGlideslope
Approach
… …
……
R
e
a
l
i
z
e
d
 
A
c
t
i
o
n
s
Translate to
Hierarchy
Example Activity Plan
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Scrolls this direction
Nominal ReplanningRequired
Future
Task Group
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Scrolls this direction
Nominal ReplanningRequired
Future
Task Group
(high level task)
Projection
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Stochastic 
Sampling
& Local Search
Fast Time Simulation
Monitors and Reaction
• Execution monitors check aircraft situation
• Remedial actions to repair plan
• Unplanned Contingencies 
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Testing & Integration
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Flight Simulation Integration with PLEXIL
– Instrument monitoring
– Automated flight
Prototype UI Design
– Timeline view
– Gantt chart style
• Based on location of aircraft
• Timeline of best start times (not 
duration)
– Matches with trajectory vertical 
profile and waypoints
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Common Themes
Focus on Operational Decision Making
Evolution from Pilot Decision Support to Human-Autonomy Teaming
Qantas A380 Uncontained Engine Failure
Explosion of Alert Messages
 QF 32;  Singapore to Sydney; 469 people on board
 4 minutes after Take-off, engine no. 2 bursts, severely 
damaging other equipment
 43 ECAM messages in first 60 seconds; 10 additional later
 50 minutes to sort through the non-normal checklists (NNCs)
“It was hard to work out a list of 
what had failed; it was getting to 
be too much to follow.  So we 
inverted our logic: Instead of 
worrying about what failed, I 
said ‘Let’s look at what’s 
working.’”       A380 Captain
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Airplane System
Failure
Identify a non-normal
checklist (NNC) tied 
to a component failure Complete NNCs,
as needed
Use “Notes” to identify
operational limitations
Make decision
about need to divert
Identify urgent actions
(for stable flight)
Contradictions
Not Prioritized
Redundancies
Not Organized
by Flight Phase
No Decision Aid 
/ Support
Current Approach to Aircraft System Alerting
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What is a Capability?
Airplane System Components
Hydraulic system
Thrust Reverser
Battery
Air conditioning pack
Airplane Capabilities
Range / Endurance
Stopping Distance (on runway)
Ability to perform a specific approach
Ability to enter RVSM airspace
Airplane system 
components have failed
What can I do?
Where can I go?
Explicit Alerting on Capabilities
Typically, we don’t
787
449 EICAS messages (Warning, Caution, Advisory)
All but 19 of them reflect physical system failures/           
status changes
Can I Fly?
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Explicit Alerting on Capabilities
Sometimes, we do . . . .
Examples from the 787
 NO AUTOLAND
 NO LAND 3
 NAV UNABLE RNP
 STALL PROTECTION
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The New Generation of Systems is Different
So are the pilots . . . . 
Airplane System Integration        Pilot System Knowledge
 Airplanes have become more integrated–more shared resources, more 
interconnections–and failures can have effects that are difficult to 
anticipate or understand
 The volume and rate of crew alert and status messages can increase 
significantly for certain types of failures
 Non-normal procedure design for combinations of failures is challenging
 Air turnbacks or diversions occur due to confusion about severity of the 
failures, and impact on the mission
Both types of errors occur:  
- Poor understanding of real problems
- Oversensitivity to trivial changes
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Three Types of Information for the Pilot 
Answering Basic Questions
 Status of Airplane Capabilities
 What is working/what is not?
 How can I restore what has been lost?
 Operational Guidance
 Which limitations do I need to observe during the 
remainder of the mission?
 Mission Objectives
 Can I still complete the planned mission?
 If not, where else can I land?
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Airplane System
Failure
Present an overview of
airplane capabilities
(in addition to EICAS/ECAM)
Time Horizon 1 Time Horizon 2 Time Horizon 3
Identify operational 
limitations
by flight phase
Decision Support for 
Mission Decision
Identify urgent actions
(for stable flight)
Prioritized
NNC selection
Dynamic
Organized by
Phase of Flight
Ability to Look
Ahead for Limitations
Integrate Airplane
Capabilities with
Airport, Weather,
NOTAMS, etc
Identify “Compatible”
Airports within Range
An Alternative Approach
Goals: reconfigure systems to restore
as much capability as possible;
understand generally what is possible 
Goals: operate with an 
understanding of ops
limitations for remaining flight; 
do not “fly into”
new problems
Goals: understand where you can 
go and where is “best” to go;
look at trade-offs; understand risks
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Thinking about Human-Autonomy Teaming
 Initially, we pull together information relevant to mission/diversion; e.g., 
airplane compatibility / capability (range)
airport information
weather information
Then, organize it in a way that flight crews can benefit, understanding 
how to present it to support collaborative decision making
Finally, transition some elements to a more autonomous advisor
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Planned Activities
Develop a “framework/language” for communicating airplane 
capabilities
Pilot interviews and prototyping
Develop a small set of failure cases 
Develop system models to simulate system failures
Collaborate with industry (e.g. SAA with Boeing)
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